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Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and Constitutional
Development & Another, the applicant argued that the law which
permitted natural persons to institute private prosecutions and prevented
companies and associations from doing so violated section 9 of the
Constitution which protects the right to equality. The court held that the
discrimination in question was not unfair. In this note, the author assesses
the court’s reasoning and recommends that there may be a need to
empower companies to institute private prosecutions in South Africa. 
Key words: Private prosecution; juristic person; companies;
discrimination; South Africa
1 Introduction
Textbooks on discrimination law and practice are littered with court
cases dealing with companies which were alleged to have
discriminated against their employees or which have been found by
judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to have discriminated against their
employees. It is on rare occasions that one finds a company alleging
that a given piece of legislation is discriminatory against it. This could
explain why some of the leading textbooks on discrimination law in
the United Kingdom do not have any reference to a court case
dealing with discrimination against companies.1 Leading textbooks on
company law in the United Kingdom are also silent on the issue of
discrimination against companies.2 Where the issue of discrimination
is discussed, the authors of some of these books deal with issues such
as the company’s legal obligation not to discriminate against people
with disabilities;3 corporate criminal liability;4 discriminatory articles of
association;5 discrimination against some members of the company;6
and discrimination against shareholders.7 In South Africa, as in the
United Kingdom, there are cases in which companies have been
found by judicial or quasi-judicial bodies to have discriminated against
their employees.8 In October 2014, the High Court of South Africa, in
National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of
Justice and Constitutional Development & Another,9 dealt with the issue
of whether a law which allowed natural persons to institute private
1 See eg M Connolly Townshend-Smith on discrimination law: Text, cases and
materials (2004); M Sargeant (ed) Discrimination law (2004); C Palmer et al
Discrimination law handbook (2007); and A McColgan Discrimination: Text, cases
and materials (2005).
2 B Hannigan Company law (2012); D Kershaw Company law in context: Text and
materials (2012).
3 C Wild & S Weinstein Smith and Keenan’s company law (2013) 484.
4 A Dignam Hicks and Goo’s cases and materials on company law (2011) 131.
5 Dignam (n 4 above) 234.
6 Dignam 432.
7 Dignam 446 482.
8 See, generally, I Currie & J de Waal The Bill of Rights handbook (2013) 209-243.
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prosecutions but barred companies from doing so, was
discriminatory. The Court held that the law did not unfairly
discriminate against companies because, inter alia, the relevant
legislative provision could not be interpreted to accommodate juristic
persons (companies). The purpose of the article is to highlight the
judgment and to argue that, in light of the practice in some countries
in Europe, Africa, Asia, Australasia and North America, where
companies are permitted to institute private prosecutions, there is a
need for the law in South Africa to be amended to allow companies to
institute private prosecutions. The author argues that the fear
expressed by the South African High Court that allowing many
people, including companies, to institute private prosecutions would
be tantamount to creating an alternative prosecuting system, is not
supported by evidence from countries where companies are
empowered to institute private prosecutions. The author concludes
the article by recommending that the law, as it stands in South Africa,
needs to be amended to expressly empower companies to institute
private prosecutions. The author highlights the law on private
prosecutions in South Africa (including the provision that that was
challenged by the applicant) before dealing with the facts of the case,
the arguments by counsel and the court’s finding.
2 Private prosecutions in South Africa
In South African law there are three categories of private prosecutions:
private prosecutions by individuals on the basis of a certificate nolle
prosequi (the focus of this article); private prosecutions by statutory
bodies; and private prosecutions conferred on individuals by certain
legislation. I briefly highlight these categories by starting with the last
two.
2.1 Private prosecutions by statutory bodies
The first category of private prosecutions is governed by section 8 of
the Criminal Procedure Act,10 which states:
(1) Anybody upon which or person upon whom the right to prosecute in
respect of any offence is expressly conferred by law, may institute and
conduct a prosecution in respect of such offence in any court
competent to try that offence.
(2) A body which or a person who intends exercising a right of
prosecution under subsection (1), shall exercise such right only after
consultation with the [Director of Public Prosecutions] concerned and
after the [Director of Public Prosecutions] has withdrawn his right of
prosecution in respect of any specified offence or any specified class
9 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development & Another (29677/2013) [2014] ZAGPPHC 763
(8 October 2014).
10 Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977.
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or category of offences with reference to which such body or person
may by law exercise such right of prosecution.
(3) [A Director of Public Prosecutions] may, under subsection (2),
withdraw his right of prosecution on such conditions as he may deem
fit, including a condition that the appointment by such body or
person of a prosecutor to conduct the prosecution in question shall
be subject to the approval of the [Director of Public Prosecutions],
and that the [Director of Public Prosecutions] may at any time
exercise with reference to any such prosecution any power which he
might have exercised if he had not withdrawn his right of
prosecution.
It has been argued that private prosecutions under section 8 are not
private prosecutions in the true sense of word.11 This is because they
remain under the control of the Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP)
who may not authorise the person or body to prosecute or who may
at any time withdraw the private prosecutor’s right to prosecute. The
DPP also imposes the conditions that have to be followed if the
private prosecutor under section 8 is to retain his right to prosecute.
Section 8 has been invoked mainly by municipalities to prosecute
individuals and companies that break municipal laws.12
2.2 Private prosecutions under pieces of legislation other than 
the Criminal Procedure Act 
The second category of private prosecutions is found in different
pieces of legislation that authorise individuals to institute private
prosecutions against people who are alleged to have committed
offences under these laws. For example, section 33 of the National
Environmental Management Act (NEMA)13 provides:
(1) Any person may 
(a) in the public interest; or 
(b) in the interest of the protection of the environment, 
institute and conduct a prosecution in respect of any breach or threatened
breach of any duty, other than a public duty resting on an organ of state,
in any national or provincial legislation or municipal bylaw, or any
regulation, licence, permission or authorisation issued in terms of such
legislation, where that duty is concerned with the protection of the
environment and the breach of that duty is an offence.
(2) The provisions of sections 9 to 17 of the Criminal Procedure Act,
1977 (Act 51 of 1977) applicable to a prosecution instituted and
conducted under section 8 of that Act must apply to a prosecution
instituted and conducted under subsection (1): Provided that if – 
11 JJ Joubert Criminal procedure handbook (2013) 81.
12 See eg Amalgamated Beverage Industries Natal (Pty) Ltd v City Council of the City of
Durban 1994 (3) SA 170 (AD); [1994] 2 All SA 222 (A); Claymore Court (Pty) Ltd &
Another v Durban City Council 1986 (4) SA 180 (N).
13 National Environmental Management Act 107 of 1998. This section is referred to
in Le Sueur & Another v Ethekwini Municipality & Others (9714/11) [2013]
ZAKZPHC 6 (30 January 2013) para 36.
584                                                             (2015) 15 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
(a) the person prosecuting privately does so through a person
entitled to practise as an advocate or an attorney in the Republic; 
(b) the person prosecuting privately has given written notice to the
appropriate public prosecutor that he or she intends to do so;
and 
(c) the public prosecutor has not, within 28 days of receipt of such
notice, stated in writing that he or she intends to prosecute the
alleged offence, 
(i) the person prosecuting privately shall not be required to
produce a certificate issued by the Attorney-General stating
that he or she has refused to prosecute the accused; and 
(ii) the person prosecuting privately shall not be required to
provide security for such action. 
(3) The court may order a person convicted upon a private prosecution
brought under subsection (1) to pay the costs and expenses of the
prosecution, including the costs of any appeal against such
conviction or any sentence.
(4) The accused may be granted an order for costs against the person
prosecuting privately, if the charge against the accused is dismissed
or the accused is acquitted or a decision in favour of the accused is
given on appeal and the court finds either: 
(a) that the person instituting and conducting the private
prosecution did not act out of a concern for the public interest or
the protection of the environment; or 
(b) that such prosecution was unfounded, trivial or vexatious.
(5) When a private prosecution is instituted in accordance with the
provisions of this Act, the Attorney-General is barred from
prosecuting except with the leave of the court concerned.
Other pieces of legislation, such as the Prevention of Illegal Eviction
from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act14 and the Extension of
Security of Tenure Act 1997,15 similarly empower individuals to
institute private prosecutions against persons who have allegedly
committed offences under those Acts. One of the major differences
between private prosecutions, for example, under section 33 of the
National Environmental Management Act, and those under section 7
of the Criminal Procedure Act (discussed below), is that, should the
public prosecutor refuse to prosecute, the private prosecutor would
not need a certificate nolle prosequi from the DPP to institute such a
prosecution. Also, unlike under section 7 of the Criminal Procedure
Act, in terms of which a private prosecution has to be brought by a
victim or a victim’s close relative or legal representative, a private
prosecution under section 33 of NEMA may be brought in the public
interest. Finally, unlike private prosecutions under section 7 of the
Criminal Procedure Act which, as this article illustrates, can only be
instituted by natural persons, private prosecutions under section 33 of
14 Sec 8 Act 9 of 1998.
15 Sec 23 Extension of Security of Tenure Act 1997. See Crookes v Sibisi & Others
2011 (1) SACR 23 (KZP); 2011 (1) SA 491 (KZP), in which the High Court dealt
with this section in detail.
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NEMA may be instituted by juristic persons such as corporations. This
is because section 1(1)(xiii) defines a ‘person’ as including ‘a juristic
person’. Although section 33(2) of NEMA provides that the provisions
of the Criminal Procedure Act, which apply to private prosecutions
under section 8, must be applicable to the private prosecutions under
section 33(1), the private prosecutions under section 33(1) have some
of the features of private prosecutions under section 7 of the Criminal
Procedure Act. These features include the fact that, in the event of a
successful private prosecution, the court may order the offender to
reimburse the private prosecutor the costs incurred in the prosecution
and, in the event of an unsuccessful private prosecution, the court
may order the private prosecutor to reimburse the accused the costs
incurred in defending himself. In other words, private prosecutions
under section 33 of NEMA are a hybrid form of those under sections 7
and 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
2.3 Private prosecutions on the basis of a certificate nolle prosequi
A private prosecution on the basis of a certificate nolle prosequi, the
focus of this article, is provided for in section 7 of the Criminal
Procedure Act. This section provides:
(1) In any case in which a Director of Public Prosecutions declines to
prosecute for an alleged offence – 
(a) any private person who proves some substantial and peculiar
interest in the issue of the trial arising out of some injury which
he individually suffered in consequence of the commission of the
said offence; 
(b) a husband, if the said offence was committed in respect of his
wife; 
(c) the wife or child or, if there is no wife or child, any of the next of
kin of any deceased person, if the death of such person is alleged
to have been caused by the said offence; or 
(d) the legal guardian or curator of a minor or lunatic, if the said
offence was committed against his ward, 
may, subject to the provisions of section 9 and section 59(2) of the Child
Justice Act, 2008, either in person or by a legal representative, institute and
conduct a prosecution in respect of such offence in any court competent to
try that offence.
(2) (a) No private prosecutor under this section shall obtain the process
of any court for summoning any person to answer any charge
unless such private prosecutor produces to the officer authorised
by law to issue such process a certificate signed by the [Director
of Public Prosecutions] that he has seen the statements or
affidavits on which the charge is based and that he declines to
prosecute at the instance of the state. 
(b) The [Director of Public Prosecutions] shall, in any case in which
he declines to prosecute, at the request of the person intending
to prosecute, grant the certificate referred to in paragraph (a). 
(c) A certificate issued under this subsection shall lapse unless
proceedings in respect of the offence in question are instituted
586                                                             (2015) 15 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS LAW JOURNAL
by the issue of the process referred to in paragraph (a) within
three months of the date of the certificate. 
Many private prosecutions have been instituted on the basis of section
7.16 The question of whether section 7 may be invoked by a company
to institute a private prosecution first arose in the case of Barclays
Zimbabwe Nominees (Pvt) Ltd v Black.17 The question for the Supreme
Court of Appeal to decide was whether a company was ‘entitled to
bring a private prosecution’.18 The Director of Public Prosecutions
(then known as the Attorney-General) declined to prosecute the
defendant for perjury and fraud and invoked section 7 to grant a
certificate to the appellant, a company incorporated in Zimbabwe, to
prosecute the defendant. The respondent argued that the company
had no title to prosecute because it was not a person within the
meaning of section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act. The appellant
argued that the Interpretation Act defines a ‘person’ to include a
company unless the context otherwise requires. The Court observed
that the appellant’s argument was ‘attractive’ but that it could not
‘succeed’.19 The appellant also argued that the word ‘private’ under
section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act was of no significance ‘other
than to contrast such a person with a person holding public office or
an official person’.20 The Court referred to the dictionary meaning of
the word ‘person’ and to the words ‘substantial and peculiar interest’
and to the phrase ‘he individually suffered’ in section 7 to observe
that the person referred to in this section is a natural person as
opposed to a company.21 The Court added that the word ‘he’ in the
section could not be applied to companies. The Court further held
that22 
[s]ection 7(1) provides that any person referred to in (a), (b), (c) or (d) may
institute and conduct a prosecution ‘either in person or by a legal
representative’ and it would … be straining [the] language to speak of a
company instituting and conducting a prosecution ‘in person’. 
The Court added that if the word ‘private’ also applied to companies,
that would mean that section 7 ‘would apply only to private
companies. This would create an anomaly since there would seem to
be no reason in principle why a private company should be able to
16 See eg Nundalal v Director of Public Prosecutions KZN & Others (AR723/2014)
[2015] ZAKZPHC 28 (8 May 2015); Tsholo v Kgafela & Others (1244/2004) [2004]
ZANWHC 36 (9 December 2004); Phillips v Botha 1999 (2) SA 555 (SCA); [1999] 1
All SA 524 (A) (26 November 1998); and Bothma v Els & Others 2010 (2) SA 622
(CC); 2010 (1) SACR 184 (CC); 2010 (1) BCLR 1 (CC).
17 [1990] ZASCA 92; 1990 (4) SA 720 (A). 
18 Barclays Zimbabwe (n 17 above) 721.
19 Barclays Zimbabwe 722.
20 As above.
21 As above.
22 Barclays Zimbabwe (n 17 above) 724.
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prosecute and a public company should not.’23 The Court
concluded:24
The general policy of the legislature is that all prosecutions are to be public
prosecutions in the name and on behalf of the state … The exceptions are
firstly where a law expressly confers a right of private prosecution upon a
particular body or person (these bodies and persons being referred to in
section 8(2)) and secondly, those persons referred to in section 7. There
may well be sound reasons of policy for confining the right of private
prosecution to natural persons as opposed to companies, close
corporations and voluntary associations such as, for example, political
parties or clubs.
It should be noted that this case was decided before the 1996
Constitution of South Africa which, as the discussion below shows,
provides, inter alia, for the right to equality. It is the above
interpretation of section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act that the
applicant in National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals25
challenged. Our attention now turns to that judgment.
3 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals 
v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development & 
Another
The applicant, the National Council of Societies for the Prevention of
Cruelty to Animals, a statutory body26 with the objectives, inter alia,
‘to prevent the ill-treatment of animals, to take cognisance of laws
that affect animals and to make representations in connection
therewith to the appropriate authority’,27 petitioned the High Court
for ‘an order declaring section 7(1)(a) of the Criminal Procedure Act
… unconstitutional insofar as it does not permit juristic persons to also
institute private prosecutions’.28 Section 6(2)(e) of the legislation
establishing the applicant states that in order to perform its functions,
it may 
institute legal proceedings connected with its functions, including such
proceedings in an appropriate court of law or prohibit the commission by
any person of a particular kind of cruelty to animals, and assist a society in
connection with such proceedings against or by it. 
23 As above.
24 Barclays Zimbabwe (n 17 above) 726. This principle was also emphasised in
Reynolds v Beinash 1998 JDR 0510 (W).
25 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (n 9 above).
26 Established under sec 2 of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals
Act 169 of 1993.
27 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (n 9 above) para 2.
28 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (n 9 above) para 1.
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The applicant argued that its inability to institute private
prosecutions made it difficult for it to undertake some of its statutory
duties, in that:29
[O]ver the past few years it has attempted on several occasions to privately
prosecute individuals in circumstances where the state has declined to do
so. In each instance it has been met with the same response, namely that
the prosecutor cannot issue it with a certificate nolle prosequi because,
according to section 7(1)(a) of the Act, only a private person can institute a
private prosecution.
The applicant submitted that section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act
was contrary to section 9(1) of the Constitution which guarantees the
right to equality. Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that
‘[e]veryone is equal before the law and has the right to equal
protection and benefit of the law’. They added that section 7 lacked30 
any apparent rational basis for treating juristic persons differently to natural
persons with the consequent result that juristic persons do not, for all
intents and purposes, enjoy the equal protection of the law, nor do juristic
persons get the equal benefit of the law. 
It submitted further that the ‘differentiation … fails to serve a
legitimate governmental purpose and is therefore irrational and
unconstitutional’.31
The Court referred to the legislation establishing the National
Prosecuting Authority and its functions,32 and held:33
It flows from the state’s power to institute criminal proceedings that the
prosecution of crime is a matter of importance to the state. It enables the
state to fulfil its constitutional obligations to prosecute those offences that
threaten or infringe the rights of citizens … This indicates that the general
point of departure in terms of our Constitution is that all prosecutions are
to be public prosecutions in the name and on behalf of the state.
The Court further held that private prosecutions were an exception to
the general rule that it is the prerogative of the state to prosecute
crime.34 The Court referred to the case of Barclays Zimbabwe
Nominees35 and held as follows:36 
As far as both sections 7 and 8 of the [Criminal Procedure] Act are
concerned, it appears that only natural persons and public bodies may
prosecute privately. Companies and other legal persons, also voluntary
associations, do not have this right. 
Thereafter the Court discussed the requirements that a person or
body has to meet before a private prosecution is instituted under
29 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 3.
30 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 4.
31 As above.
32 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (n 9 above) para 12.
33 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 13.
34 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 14.
35 Barclays Zimbabwe (n 17 above).
36 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals (n 9 above) para 15.
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sections 7 and 8 of the Criminal Procedure Act and other pieces of
legislation.37 The Court observed:38 
[N]ot all rights in the Bill of Rights are for the benefit of juristic persons.
Section 8(4) of the Constitution provides that a juristic person is entitled to
the rights in the Bill of Rights to the extent required by the nature of the
rights and the nature of that juristic person. For example, rights to life and
to human dignity cannot sensibly be applied to juristic persons.
The Court added that ‘[i]n order to decide whether a particular right
is available to a juristic person, two factors should be taken into
account: the nature of the right in question and the nature of the
juristic person’.39 The Court referred to the legislation establishing the
applicant and observed that ‘the nature of the applicant as a juristic
person is not that of a private company, but a public body’.40 The
Court assumed ‘without deciding’ that section 9(1) of the
Constitution applied to juristic persons. It then referred to the criteria
developed by the Constitutional Court that must be followed to
determine whether a legislative provision is discriminatory:41 
It should first be determined whether the impugned provision contains a
differentiation. If it does, the next question is whether the differentiation
constitutes … discrimination. If the differentiation amounts to …
discrimination, then it should be determined whether that is an unfair
discrimination or not.
The Court held that the fact that natural persons are allowed to
institute private prosecutions but companies are not allowed to
amounts to both differentiation and discrimination.42 It further held
that what the Constitution prohibits is unfair discrimination and, in
order to determine whether the discrimination in question is unfair,
the following factors should be considered:43 
(a) the position of the complainants in society and whether they have been
victims of past patterns of discrimination; (b) the nature of the provision
and the purpose sought to be achieved by it; and (c) the extent to which
the discrimination has affected the interests or rights of the complainant.
Assessing the applicant’s position in light of the above factors, the
Court held:44
Taking into account these guidelines, it appears that (a) above more
appropriately applies to natural persons. However, insofar as it may be
applicable to the applicant I have already indicated above that the
applicant should be regarded as a public body. I am not aware whether the
applicant is a victim of past patterns of discrimination. As far as (b) above is
37 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals paras 16-18.
38 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 19.
39 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 20.
40 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 21.
41 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 22.
42 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 23.
43 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 24.
44 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals paras 25-26.
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concerned, the nature of section 7 and the purpose thereof have already
been considered above. It constitutes an exception to the constitutional
imperative stipulated in section 179 of the Constitution. The purpose is,
inter alia, to afford a way of vindicating ‘imponderable interests’ and to
curb the propensity to resort to self-help if there is a refusal by the Director
of Public Prosecutions to institute a prosecution. To put it differently, the
purpose of section 7 is to allow a private prosecution only where private or
personal interests are at stake, but to prevent other natural persons, as well
as juristic persons, not having such interests from doing so. To allow all
persons to undertake a private prosecution would be contrary to the
constitutional imperative and would effectively create an alternative
prosecuting system. As far as (c) above is concerned, the following should
be pointed out. First, in considering the effect or extend [sic] of section
7(1)(a) one must take into account that not only juristic persons are
excluded, but also other natural persons not referred to in the section. The
right to institute a private prosecution is determined by a limitation clause
which does not only differentiate between juristic and natural persons, but
also between natural persons. Second, the criteria applied to achieve this
differentiation are not arbitrary, but to serve a particular purpose, ie to
exclude persons not having a personal interest linked to some injury
individually suffered.
The Court added that, in order to ensure that there was a single
prosecuting authority in the country, it was necessary ‘to strictly
control the right of private prosecution’.45 The Court suggested that,
maybe, parliament should consider amending section 6 of the
Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act to expressly
empower the applicant to institute private prosecutions.
4 Analysis
It has been illustrated above that section 6(2)(e) of the Societies for
the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Act provides that in order to
carry out its functions, the applicant may ‘institute legal proceedings
connected with its functions, including such proceedings in an
appropriate court of law’. By holding that the applicant does not have
a right to institute a private prosecution, it means that it is rendered
incapable of performing one of the duties it was established to
perform - to ‘institute legal proceedings connected with its functions’.
The drafting history of the Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals Act is silent on whether the applicant is empowered to
institute private prosecutions.46 
As mentioned above, the Court held that ‘[t]o allow all persons to
undertake a private prosecution would be contrary to the
constitutional imperative and would effectively create an alternative
prosecuting system’. Although private prosecutions, as provided for in
section 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act, are allowed in many parts of
the world, not all persons are permitted to institute private
prosecutions. For any person to institute a private prosecution, he or
45 National Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals para 27.
46 Debates of the National Assembly (Hansard) 25 November 1993 14064-14089. 
PRIVATE PROSECUTIONS AND DISCRIMINATION AGAINST JURISTIC PERSONS IN SA 591
she must be a victim or must be representing the victim. This is the
case in countries such as Tonga,47 the Republic of Ireland,48 the Cook
Islands,49 Vanuatu,50 Canada51 and China.52 It is, therefore, not
possible for everyone, including the victims, to institute private
prosecutions. This principle is applicable to natural persons and juristic
persons where such prosecutions are allowed. Private prosecutions by
companies are allowed in different parts of the world. For example,
the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom (per Lord Wilson) in Gujra,
R (on the application of) v Crown Prosecution Service53 observed that
private prosecutions by individuals ‘are still frequently instituted’ in
the United Kingdom and that private prosecutions are also conducted
by public bodies, such as the Office of Fair Trading, the Transport for
London, and the Royal Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to
Animals.54 Lord Wilson observed that ‘[r]etail companies often
prosecute shop-lifters’ and the Crown Prosecuting Service ‘seems not
to intervene and, indeed, to be more than content thus to be spared
entry into that sphere of prosecution’.55 In Virgin Media Ltd, R (on the
application of) v Zinga56 the United Kingdom Court of Appeal
observed:57 ‘
It is now also evident that commercial organisations regularly undertake
private prosecutions. This type of private prosecution is undertaken not
only by trade organisations … but also ordinary commercial companies. 
There is also evidence from countries in Africa, Asia, Australia/Oceania
and North America that companies or corporations institute private
prosecutions. This is the case, for example, in Singapore,58 New
47 Pohiva v Tu'ivakano [2014] TOSC 1; AM20.2013 (17 January 2014) para 31.
48 Kelly & Another v District Judge Ann Ryan [2013] IEHC 321 (9 July 2013) paras 11 &
16.
49 Pera v Tangiiti [2010] CKHC 5; CRC 115-116 of 2010 (10 September 2010) para
5.
50 See Jessop v Public Prosecutor [2010] VUSC 134; Civil Case 114 of 2009 (2 July
2010) para 16.
51 Bowman & Others v Zibotics 2010 ONSC 4422 (CanLII) para 22. See also Johnson v
Saskatchewan (Attorney-General) 1997 CanLII 11117 (SK QB); Hall v Jakobek 2003
CanLII 45521 (ON SC) para 24.
52 Art 88 of the Criminal Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China [1996].
53 [2012] UKSC 52 (14 November 2012); [2013] 1 Cr App R 12, [2012] 3 WLR 1227,
[2013] 1 All ER 612, [2013] 1 AC 484, [2012] WLR(D) 330, [2012] UKSC 52.
54 Gujra (n 53 above) para 33.
55 As above.
56 [2014] 1 WLR 2228, 178 JP 105, [2014] EWCA Crim 52, [2014] 3 All ER 90,
[2014] 1 Cr App R 27, (2014) 178 JP 105, [2014] 2 Cr App R (S) 30, [2014] WLR
2228, [2014] WLR(D) 29.
57 Virgin Media (n 56 above) para 16.
58 Odex Pte Ltd v Pacific Internet Ltd [2008] SGHC 35 (7 March 2008) para 52; Vicplas
Holdings Pte Ltd v Allfit International Market Pte Ltd & Others [2010] SGHC 370 para
9. See sec 133(1) of the Criminal Procedure Code (Cap 68, 1985 Ed); and secs
11(10), 12 & 13 of the Criminal Procedure Code 2010 (15 of 2010).
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Zealand,59 Canada,60 Kenya,61 Zimbabwe62 and Vanuatu.63 In
Singapore, Kenya, Vanuatu and Zimbabwe, as in South Africa, the law
does not provide expressly that juristic persons have the right to
institute private prosecutions. However, courts in these countries,
unlike in South Africa, have held that they may institute private
prosecutions, or the accused have not contested the juristic person’s
right to institute private prosecutions. In Canada, the right of a
corporation to institute a private prosecution is not expressly provided
for in national or provincial legislation, but it is derived from English
common law.64 In New Zealand, the Criminal Procedure Act provides
specifically that a private prosecution may be brought by an individual
or an organisation.65 The above examples reveal that South Africa is
not the only country where legislation does not specifically provide for
the right of juristic persons to institute private prosecutions.
In the author’s opinion, allowing companies to institute private
prosecutions does not mean that there will be no control mechanism
to ensure that they do not abuse their right. There is evidence that
private prosecutions under section 7 have been abused by some
59 See Banks v District Court at Auckland [2013] NZHC 3221 (3 December 2013) para
14; and Haines v Waikato District Law Society Hc Ham Civ-2006-419-426 [2006]
NZHC 963 (23 August 2006) para 8.
60 United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America, Local 1072 v Universal
Showcase/idX Company 2006 CanLII 1614 (ON LRB) para 15; and Letourneau v
Clearbrook Iron Works Ltd 2005 FC 333 (CanLII) para 7.
61 Lois Holdings Limited v Ndiwa Tamboi & 184 Others [2014] eKLR 1 para 7.
62 In Telecel Zimbabwe (Pvt) Ltd v AG of Zimbabwe NO Civil Appeal SC 254/11 [2014]
ZWSC 1 (28 January 2014), the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe held that, like
natural persons, juristic persons also have a right to institute a private prosecution.
In arriving at this conclusion, the Court distinguished the relevant South African
case law and legislation on this issue, in particular the case of Barclays Zimbabwe
Nominees (n 17 above) and sec 7 of the Criminal Procedure Act. However, in
October 2015, notwithstanding serious opposition from especially the opposition
members of parliament, the Zimbabwean National Assembly passed the Criminal
Procedure and Evidence [HB 2, 2015] which, inter alia, provides that juristic
persons shall not have a right to institute private prosecutions. The Zimbabwean
Minister of Justice argued that there was a need to expressly prohibit juristic
persons from instituting private prosecutions as they could abuse that right and
prosecute especially poor people. See National Assembly Hansard 14 October
2015 Vol 42 No 13, http://www.parlzim.gov.zw/national-assembly-hansard/
national-assembly-hansard-14-october-2015-vol-42-no-13 (accessed 29 October
2015).
63 Lauto v Public Prosecutor [2003] VUSC 75; Criminal Case 010 of 2003 (21 April
2003). (The appellant, as employee of BP, was convicted in a private prosecution
filed by BP after misappropriating some of its money. The private prosecution was
instituted on the basis of a certificate issued by the public prosecutor.) Etmat Bay
Estate Ltd v Magna Ltd [2014] VUSC 79; Civil Case 101 of 2010 (4 July 2014). See
secs 1, 35(2), 98, 99 & 103 of the Criminal Procedure Code, ch 136.
64 See, generally, P Burns ‘Private prosecutions in Canada: The law and a proposal for
change’ (1975) 21 McGill Law Journal 269-297. 
65 Sec 16(2)(e) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2011. See also sec 6(c) of the Criminal
Disclosure Act 2008, which recognised the right to private prosecution in New
Zealand.
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individuals and courts have stepped in to put an end to such abuse.66
Companies would not be prosecuting the accused in private courts.
These prosecutions would be conducted in public courts and the
accused would be entitled to all the rights of an accused under
section 35(3) of the Constitution.67 Judicial officers would be able to
prevent or stop any abuse. It should also be noted that there is
nothing in the Constitution or the Criminal Procedure Act which
would prevent the Director of Public Prosecutions from intervening
and discontinuing a private prosecution by a company should the
company abuse the process. Private companies that institute frivolous
or vexatious prosecutions against individuals or other companies
should also be prepared to compensate the accused for the trouble he
has been put through and the costs incurred should the accused be
acquitted.68 Such mechanisms would ensure that a company only
institutes a private prosecution when it has a strong case against the
accused. Another mechanism would be to allow private companies to
66 Eg, Phillips v Botha (591/96) [1998] ZASCA 105; 1999 (2) SA 555 (SCA); [1999] 1
All SA 524 (A) (26 November 1998) (using a private prosecution to enforce the
payment of an illegal gambling debt); Nundalal v Director of Public Prosecutions
KZN & Others (AR723/2014) [2015] ZAKZPHC 28 (8 May 2015) (summons in a
private prosecution not signed by the private prosecutor, instituting a private
prosecution without lodging a certificate nolle prosequi with the clerk of the
magistrate’s court, and without paying the required security deposit).
67 This section provides that ‘[e]very accused person has a right to a fair trial, which
includes the right (a) to be informed of the charge with sufficient detail to answer
it; (b) to have adequate time and facilities to prepare a defence; (c) to a public
trial before an ordinary court; (d) to have their trial begin and conclude without
unreasonable delay; (e) to be present when being tried; (f) to choose, and be
represented by, a legal practitioner and to be informed of this right promptly; (g)
to have a legal practitioner assigned to the accused person by the state and at
state expense, if substantial injustice would otherwise result, and to be informed
of this right promptly; (h) to be presumed innocent, to remain silent, and not to
testify during the proceedings; (i) to adduce and challenge evidence; (j) not to be
compelled to give self-incriminating evidence; (k) to be tried in a language that
the accused person understands or, if that is not practicable, to have the
proceedings interpreted in that language; (l) not to be convicted for an act or
omission that was not an offence under either national or international law at the
time it was committed or omitted; (m) not to be tried for an offence in respect of
an act or omission for which that person has previously been either acquitted or
convicted; (n) to the benefit of the least severe of the prescribed punishments if
the prescribed punishment for the offence has been changed between the time
that the offence was committed and the time of sentencing; and (o) of appeal to,
or review by, a higher court’.
68 Sec 16 of the Criminal Procedure Act provides: ‘(1) Where in a private
prosecution, other than a prosecution contemplated in section 8, the charge
against the accused is dismissed or the accused is acquitted or a decision in favour
of the accused is given on appeal, the court dismissing the charge or acquitting
the accused or deciding in favour of the accused on appeal, may order the private
prosecutor to pay to such accused the whole or any part of the costs and
expenses incurred in connection with the prosecution or, as the case may be, the
appeal. (2) Where the court is of the opinion that a private prosecution was
unfounded and vexatious, it shall award to the accused at his request such costs
and expenses incurred in connection with the prosecution, as it may deem fit.’ In
Solomon v Magistrate, Pretoria, & Another 1950 (3) SA 603 (T), the court held that
‘[t]he legislature … must have contemplated that private prosecutors might in
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prosecute minor offences and to leave the prosecution of serious
offences to the state.
There are also some advantages in allowing private companies to
institute private prosecutions. One, the government will be saving
some of its resources as companies may be able to instruct their own
investigators to collect the evidence needed to prosecute the accused.
One should not lose sight of the fact that, if an offence is committed
against a company, it is the company that has an interest in ensuring
that the accused is prosecuted and punished. This is because the
company is the victim. Case law from South African courts shows that
the fact that companies cannot institute private prosecutions could
explain why some of them are now making funds available to the
National Prosecuting Authority to engage private lawyers to prosecute
those who are alleged to have committed offences against them.69
This should be understood against the background that crimes against
businesses, including companies, have been on the rise in South Africa
68 many cases have weak grounds for prosecution – a decision by the Attorney-
General not to prosecute would indicate this – but the policy of parliament, no
doubt, was to allow prosecution even in weak cases, in order to avoid the taking
of the law by the complainant into his own hands. The Act contains no provision
requiring that the private prosecutor shall satisfy anyone that he has a prima facie
case. The penalty for vexatious and unfounded prosecution is liability for costs.’
See 613.
69 This is done on the basis of sec 38 of the National Prosecuting Authority Act 38 of
1998, which provides: ‘(1) The National Director may in consultation with the
Minister, and a Deputy National Director or a Director may, in consultation with
the Minister and the National Director, on behalf of the state, engage, under
agreements in writing, persons having suitable qualifications and experience to
perform services in specific cases. (2) The terms and conditions of service of a
person engaged by the National Director, a Deputy National Director or a Director
under subsection (1) shall be as determined from time to time by the Minister in
concurrence with the Minister of Finance. (3) Where the engagement of a person
contemplated in subsection (1) will not result in financial implications for the state
(a) the National Director; or (b) a Deputy National Director or a Director, in
consultation with the National Director, may, on behalf of the state, engage,
under an agreement in writing, such person to perform the services contemplated
in subsection (1) without consulting the Minister as contemplated in that
subsection. (4) For purposes of this section, “services” include the conducting of a
prosecution under the control and direction of the National Director, a Deputy
National Director or a Director, as the case may be.’ In Bonugli & Another v Deputy
National Director of Public Prosecutions & Others 2010 (2) SACR 134 (T), the
charges of fraud against the applicants in respect of company UZ had been
withdrawn by the Director of Public Prosecutions. Later, the Deputy National
Director of Public Prosecutions allowed an application by UZ’s attorney that the
applicants should be prosecuted for defrauding the company. In that application,
UZ indicated that it would pay for the costs involved in the prosecution of the
applicants by engaging its own advocates. UZ transferred the money that was
meant to pay for the advocates’ services into a bank account controlled by the
DPP. In theory, the advocates’ bills were being paid by the office of the DPP. The
applicants argued that their trial was not fair because the circumstances
surrounding their prosecution made it impossible for the private prosecutors to
prosecute without fear, favour or prejudice. The court held that ‘[s] 38(3) of the
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for some years now.70 Allowing companies to launch their
investigations and to use the evidence obtained through these
investigations in prosecutions enables the police to concentrate on
other cases the outcome of which is not the concern, at least directly,
of companies. Two, companies will instruct their own lawyers to
prosecute the accused. The advantage here is that state prosecutors
will concentrate on prosecuting those cases they need to prosecute.
Allowing companies to instruct their lawyers to prosecute those who
have committed offences against them will not violate the accused’s
right to a fair trial. This fact was emphasised by the South African
Supreme Court of Appeal when it held that71 
the right to a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial
tribunal did not include a right to an independent and impartial
prosecutor, inter alia, because such a right would be incompatible with
prosecutions by statutory and private prosecutors. 
In conclusion, allowing companies to institute private prosecutions in
South Africa would not threaten the accused’s right to a fair trial and
would allow some state institutions, such as the police and the
National Prosecuting Authority, to concentrate on those offences that
do not serve the interests of companies.
69 NPA Act envisages that the fees of prosecutors appointed under s 38 may be paid
by someone other than the state. Accordingly, the mere fact that someone else
funds the prosecution cannot be objectionable. In this case, however, the
advocates are paid by the complainant who urged the prosecution after it had
been withdrawn ... In my view, a reasonable and informed person would on the
basis of these facts already reasonably apprehend that the advocates would not
throughout, albeit subconsciously, act without fear, favour or prejudice. In the
course of a criminal prosecution the prosecutor must, virtually on a daily basis,
take decisions that might seriously impact on the rights and interests of the
accused. The potential for a prosecutor paid by the complainant who had urged
the prosecution, subconsciously to have undue regard to the interests of the
complainant who foots the bill, is self-evident.’ See 145. In S v Tshotshoza &
Others 2010 (2) SACR 274 (GNP) para 14, the court held that ‘[i]t follows that the
argument that the appointment is not in accordance with s 38 of the Act cannot
be sustained. As to what the right-minded objective person would make of the
mode of payment, it is evident that this matter differs totally from the Bonugli
matter. That was a matter where the prosecution was based on fraudulent
conduct of the accused. The complainant tried to minimise its losses, as caused by
the fraud ...The complainant was conducting what in fact was a private
prosecution as if it were a public prosecution. In this matter the individual banks
do not have much hope of getting redress for their losses in the case of a
successful prosecution. They are not directly involved in the prosecutions, and
cannot and do not prescribe to the prosecutor to prosecute, and, if a prosecution
commences, how to conduct the prosecution. Their contributions are more of a
self-imposed tax and the payment of the prosecutor is much more akin to the
payment of public prosecutors who get paid from public funds. A right-minded
objective person will not have a perception of possible prejudice.’ See also Porritt
& Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions & Others [2015] 1 All SA 169
(SCA); 2015 (1) SACR 533 (SCA).
70 See South African Police Service Crime Statistics Report (2014/2015) http://
www.saps.gov.za/resource_centre/publications/statistics/crimestats/2015/
crime_stats.php (accessed 29 October 2015).
71 Porritt (n 69 above) para16.
